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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
ooOoo 
MATTHEW S. KELLOGG, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
STAN J. CHRISTENSEN and 
ROBERT ANTHONY APGOOD, 
Defendants and Appellees. 
Case No. 950441-CA 
Priority No. 15 
-00O00-
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
MATTHEW S. KELLOGG 
Appeal from Summary Judgment entered by the Honorable 
William A. Thorne, Third Judicial District Court, 
on April 25, 1995 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this 
appeal pursuant to Utah Code Annotated §78-2-2(4). This case was 
assigned from the Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals 
on or about June 23, 1995 [R 179]. 
1 
DETERMINATIVE AUTHORITY 
In addition to the relevant case law cited hereinafter, the 
Appellant in the above-entitled case believes the following 
authority to be determinative of this dispute on appeal: 
Utah Code Annotated §78-12-25 
Utah Code Annotated §78-12-29 
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 56, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
When reviewing a summary judgment, the appellate court 
affords no deference to the legal conclusions of the trial court. 
Walker v. Briqham City, 856 P.2d 347 (Utah 1993). Furthermore, in 
making the dtermination as to whether or not the summary judgment 
below was appropriate, the appellate court will review the facts 
and all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom in the light most 
favorable to the non-moving party. K & T, Inc. v. Koroulis, 254 
Utah Advance Report 3 (Utah 1994). 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. Whether the Third Judicial District Court in and 
for Salt Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable William A. 
2 
Thorne presiding, abused its discretion in granting the 
Defendants' and Appellees' Motions to Amend their Complaints, in 
order to add the statute of limitations for the Plaintiff's First 
Cause of Action for assault, as an affirmative defense, after the 
Defendants had failed to plead this affirmative defense in their 
original Answers, and after they had failed to plead this 
affirmative defense for over two (2) years thereafter [R 42, R 
70]. In reviewing the lower court's ruling on a motion to amend, 
a primary consideration for the appellate court should include a 
determination as to whether any party received an unfair advantage 
or disadvantage thereby. Rinqwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc./ 
786 P.2d 1350 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 
1990). 
2. Whether the trial court erred, as a matter of law, 
in granting the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment, as to 
both of the Plaintiff's Causes of Action of assault and negligence 
against the Defendants, by applying the year (1) year statute of 
limitations for assault, which was only the Plaintiff's First 
Cause of Action, to the entirety of the Plaintiff's claim [R 137]. 
By necessity, this issue includes a determination as to whether 
the trial court erred, as a matter of law, in ruling that the 
Plaintiff and Appellant could not maintain an assault, or 
3 
intentional cause of action, contemporaneously with a negligence 
cause of action, arising out of the same fact situation [R 137; 
see Standard of Review, supra]. 
3. Whether there are genuine issues of material fact 
remaining in this case relative to the Appellant's negligence 
cause of action and with respect to equitable issues pertaining to 
the injury suffered by the Plaintiff and Appellant as the result 
of the Defendants' and Appellees' delay and failure, for over two 
(2) years, to plead the affirmative defense of statute of 
limitations [R 137; see Standard of Review, supra]. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a Summary Judgment entered in favor of 
the Defendants and Appellees Stan J. Christensen and Robert 
Anthony Apgood in this personal injury case [R 172]. The case was 
originally assigned to the Third Judicial District Court, the 
Honorable James S. Sawaya presiding [R 2], and was then reassigned 
to the Honorable Tyrone E. Medley [R 21]. The case was ultimately 
transferred on or about February 24, 1995, to Judge William A. 
Thorne [R 158], and was heard before Judge Thorne on March 30, 
1995 [R 170]. The subsequent Order granting the Defendants' and 
Appellees' Motions for Summary Judgment was signed and entered by 
4 
the Court on April 25, 1995 [R 172]. The Plaintiff and Appellant 
filed his Notice of Appeal on May 3, 1995, which was received by 
the Utah Supreme Court of the State of Utah on May 10, 1995 [R 
174]. On or about June 23, 1995 this case was assigned by the 
Utah Supreme Court to the Utah Court of Appeals [R 179]. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
1. On or about August 5, 1991, at approximately 8:00 
p.m., the Plaintiff was assaulted and injured, through the 
negligent and intentional actions of the Defendants, at the 
Glenmoor Golf Course located at 9800 South 4800 West, West Jordan, 
Utah [R 3 - R 7], where the Defendants made an unprovoked attack. 
2. As a result of this attack by the Defendants and 
Appellees upon the Plaintiff and Appellant, the Plaintiff's and 
Appellant's lips were sutured, and an x-ray taken of the Plaintiff 
and Appellant indicated that there was a hairline fracture to the 
Plaintiff's and Appellant's cheek bone [R 3 - R 7]. 
3* The Defendants' and Appellees' attack upon the 
Plaintiff and Appellant caused him to incur medical expenses, and 
in addition the Plaintiff and Appellant suffered great pain and 
mental anguish as the result of the Defendants' and Appellees' 
5 
conduct [R 3 - R 7] . 
4. On or about September 21, 1992, the Plaintiff and 
Appellant filed his Verified Complaint, alleging the intentional 
tort of assault, and also alleging negligence against the 
Defendants and Appellees [R 2; also see copy of Verified 
Complaint, attached hereto as Exhibit "A"]. The Defendants1 and 
Appellees' conduct and attack upon the Plaintiff was done 
knowingly and intentionally, as set forth within the First Cause 
of Action of the Plaintiff's and Appellant's Verified Complaint 
[see Exhibit "A"]. The Defendants' and Appellees' conduct was 
also negligent, as set forth within the Second Cause of Action of 
the Plaintiff's and Appellant's Verified Complaint [see Exhibit 
"A"], in light of the potential for harm to the Plaintiff and 
Appellant under said circumstances, and the lack of regard for the 
safety of the Plaintiff. Therefore, the Plaintiff and Appellant 
made a claim against the Defendants and Appellees for punitive 
damages in the amount of $50,000*00 [R 4; also see Exhibit "A"]. 
5. In their respective Answers to the Plaintiff's and 
Appellant's Verified Complaint, the Defendants and Appellees Stan 
J. Christensen and Robert Anthony Apgood failed to assert the 
^affirmative defense of statute of limitations [R 9, R 19]. 
6 
6# It is undisputed by the parties that for a period 
of over two (2) years, from September of 1992 until December of 
1994, the Defendants and Appellees Stan J. Christensen and Robert 
Anthony Apgood, who both made the election to act as pro se 
litigants, did not attempt to assert this affirmative defense, 
either in an amended answer or otherwise [R 137]. 
7. The Plaintiff and Appellant relied upon this 
failure to assert the affirmative defense of statute of 
limitations, and conducted discovery and otherwise directed his 
legal counsel to proceed with his case, incurring thousands of 
dollars of expense for costs and legal fees over the last two (2) 
years [R 137]. 
8. The Defendant and Appellee Stan J. Christensen 
finally retained counsel to represent him, which counsel filed a 
Notice of Appearance on or about November 1, 1994 [R 29], and the 
Defendant Robert Anthony Apgood finally retained counsel to 
represent him, which counsel filed a Notice of Appearance on or 
about December 5, 1994 [R 55, R 67]. 
9. Counsel for these respective Defendants and 
7 
Appellees immediately moved the Court to amend their clients' 
Answers, purportedly to correct technical errors, inasmuch as the 
Defendants and Appellees had acted pro se throughout these 
proceedings. The Defendants' counsel did not disclose the fact 
that they intended to forthwith assert the affirmative defense of 
statute of limitations [R 47, R 59]. 
10. The Plaintiff and Appellant, in his Memoranda in 
Opposition to the respective Motions to Amend, expressed his 
concern about the ability of the Defendants and Appellees to 
assert affirmative defenses at that late date, and therefore also 
objected to an amendment of the Defendants' and Appellees' Answers 
for that purpose [R 42, R 70]. 
11. Nevertheless, the lower court granted the Motions 
to Amend of the Defendants [R 84, R 170]. The Defendants then 
conveniently claimed, in their Amended Answers and in their 
Memoranda in Support of their Motions for Summary Judgment, that 
all of the Plaintiff s claims were barred, based upon the 
affirmative defense of statute of limitations [R 31, R 99]. 
12. The lower court then granted the Defendants' and 
Appellees' Motions for Summary Judgment as to all of the 
8 
Plaintiff's claims, based solely upon the one-year statute of 
limitations corresponding only to the Plaintiff's First Cause of 
Action for assault [R 170]. The Court ruled that it was not 
possible to contemporaneously assert a cause of action for assault 
and a cause of action for negligencef and thus applied the shorter 
of the two statutes of limitations in barring completely the 
Plaintiff's and Appellant's claims [R 170, R 172]. 
13. The Plaintiff and Appellant filed his Notice of 
Appeal on May 3f 1995 [R 174]. On or about May 31, 1995, the 
Appellee Christensen filed a Motion for Summary Disposition, and 
on or about June 7, 1995, the Appellee Apgood filed a Motion for 
Summary Disposition, which Motions were denied on or about July 
19, 1995. The case was transferred by the Utah Supreme Court to 
the Utah Court of Appeals on or about June 23, 1995 [R 179]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The Third Judicial District Court, the Honorable Judges 
William A. Thorne and Tyrone E. Medley presiding, clearly abused 
its discretion in granting the Defendants' Motions to Amend their 
Answers, and the Defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment. A 
party should not be permitted to amend its pleading, in order to 
add an affirmative defense which was previously omitted, if the 
9 
result will be to unfairly disadvantage the nonmoving party. 
In addition, the Utah appellate courts have ruled 
unequivocally that causes of action for assault and for negligence 
are not necessarily mutually exclusive. Therefore, the lower 
court should not have granted the Defendants' Motions for Summary 
Judgment, based solely upon the application of the one-year 
statute of limitations for the Plaintiff's assault claim, as a 
complete bar to the Plaintiff's and Appellant's claims for 
negligence. 
Finally, there are genuine issues of material fact remaining 
in this case, to be heard and determined by the trier of fact, 
with respect to the Plaintiff's and Appellant's negligence and 
equitable estoppel claims. Therefore, this case should be 
remanded for such a determination on said genuine issues of 
material fact. 
ARGUMENTS 
I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING THE DEFENDANTS1 
MOTIONS TO AMEND THEIR ANSWERS, PURSUANT TO RULE 15, 
UTAH RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
In accordance with Rule 15(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
leave to amend pleadings shall be freely given by the Court when 
justice so requires. Although the Plaintiff and Appellant does 
10 
not dispute this general rulef the Plaintiff and Appellant also 
refers to Rule 8(c) and Rule 12(h), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, 
which pertain to affirmative defenses• The Utah Supreme Court has 
held that is affirmative defenses are not plead in a defendant's 
answer, they are waived: 
Because an affirmative defense raises matters outside the 
scope of plaintiff's prima facie case, matters constituting 
such defenses must be pleaded, and are not put in issue by a 
denial pursuant to Subdivision (b) of this rule [Rule 8, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure]; failure to so plead 
constitutes waiver of the defense pursuant to 
Rule 12(h) [emphasis added]. 
Moreover, Utah courts have held that in general, even when a 
defendant has been permitted to amend his answer, he is not 
entitled to amend in order to cure a defect by adding affirmative 
defenses which were not plead in his original answer, and which 
were therefore waived. Goeltz v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 
299 P.2d 832 (Utah 1956). Meyer v. Deluke, 457 P.2d 966 (Utah 
1969). 
Furthermore, the above rule and case law apply even when pro 
se litigants are involved. Defendant Robert Anthony Apgood 
asserted, in his Memorandum of Points and Authorities in Support 
of Defendant Apgood*s Motion to File Amended Answer, that "the 
prior answer was filed pro se by the defendant individually who is 
not knowledgeable with respect to disputes in litigation and 
before he had consulted with counsel" [R 61]. Nevertheless, the 
11 
Utah Supreme Court has held that, in general, "a party who 
represents himself will be held to the same standard of knowledge 
and practice as any qualified member of the barf" and thus that 
party must pay the consequence of his actions. Wurst v. 
Department of Employment Security, 818 P.2d 1036 (Utah App. 1991), 
citing Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207 (Utah 1983) [the court is 
not required to interrupt the course of proceedings to translate 
legal terms, explain legal rules, or otherwise attempt to redress 
the ongoing consequences of a party's decision to function in a 
capacity for which he is not trained]. 
The Appellees made the decision not to retain counsel, they 
voluntarily acted pro se throughout these proceedings, and they 
put off hiring legal counsel until a mere three months prior to 
the previously scheduled trial before the lower court. The 
Appellees must therefore pay the consequences of their decision, 
and the Appellant should not have been prejudiced or 
inconvenienced by the Appellees' own failure to retain counsel. 
It has been held by the Utah Supreme Court that in 
considering motions to amend pleadings, primary considerations 
include without limitation whether parties have adequate notice to 
meet new issues and whether any party receives an unfair advantage 
or disadvantage. Rinqwood v. Foreign Auto Works, Inc., 786 P.2d 
1350 (Utah Ct. App.), cert, denied, 795 P.2d 1138 (Utah 1990). 
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Therefore, to the extent that the Defendants and Appellees sought 
to assert any affirmative defenses which were not included in 
their original Answers, the Appellant maintains that the Appellees 
should not have been given permission by this Court to amend their 
Complaints. These amendments clearly placed the Appellant at a 
significant disadvantage, and in fact ultimately resulted in a 
disposition of the entire case before the trial court. 
II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED, AS A MATTER OF LAW, IN RULING 
THAT THE PLAINTIFF'S CAUSES OF ACTION FOR ASSAULT AND 
FOR NEGLIGENCE WERE MUTUALLY EXCLUSIVE 
Utah Code Annotated §78-12-25, and §78-12-29 set forth 
respectively the statute of limitations for negligence and for 
assault causes of action. Section 78-12-25(3) provides that a 
claim for an action for relief not otherwise provided for by law, 
namely a claim for negligence, must be made within four years, 
whereas Section 78-12-29(4) provides that a claim for assault must 
be made within one year. 
The Defendants and Appellees, in sole support of their Motion 
for Summary Disposition of this appeal before the Utah Supreme 
Court [a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "B"], 
previously made the argument that: 
The Appellant missed filing his Verified Complaint 
within the statute of limitations period for assault 
and battery and could not then attempt to convert an 
13 
intentional tort into a negligence claim in order 
to fall within the four year statute of limitations 
period applicable to a negligence cause of action [emphasis 
added; see Exhibit "B" at Page 4]. 
It is important to include the above quotation within the 
Appellant's principal Appellate Brief, inasmuch as it serves to 
demonstrate and epitomize the line of reasoning of the Defendants 
and Appellees, and indeed of the lower court, with respect to the 
Plaintiff's and Appellant's two causes of action of assault and 
negligence. It is undisputed by and between the parties herein 
that the Plaintiff and Appellant, within his Verified Complaint, 
set forth two causes of action, the intentional tort of assault, 
and the tort of negligence [see Exhibit "A", beginning at Page 3] 
Therefore, the Plaintiff and Appellant logically could not have, 
and indeed did not need to "convert" his claim of an intentional 
tort into one of negligence. 
The Defendants and Appellees, as well as the trial court 
below, have apparently made the assumption, which is erroneous as 
a matter of law, that a cause of action for an intentional tort, 
and a cause of action for a tort involving negligence, when 
arising from the same conduct, are mutually exclusive. 
Nevertheless, the Utah Supreme Court recently held, in Doe v. Doe, 
878 P.2d 1161 (Utah App. 1994), that: 
An individual's acts can simultaneously give rise to a 
claim for negligence and a claim for an intentional tort. 
14 
The two doctrines are not necessarily mutually 
exclusive, but rather may overlap and coexist on a 
continuum [emphasis added]. 
In Doe, the trial court had granted the defendant's motion for 
summary judgment, and the Utah Court of Appeals, using the above 
rationale, held that the trial court improperly granted this 
motion on the Plaintiff's negligence claim, and remanded the case 
for resolution of the fact-sensitive issue of whether John Doe's 
acts constituted negligence. 
Furthermore, the Utah Supreme Court, in the case of Strange 
v. Ostlund, 594 P.2d 877, 881 (Utah 1979), further clarified this 
point by holding: 
The line of culpability between that conduct which is 
simply negligent and that conduct which is clearly 
intentional is a matter of degree. And at some point 
along that line, accumulated aggravation of negligence 
amounts to willful misconduct. Terms such as willful 
negligence, gross negligence, and willful misconduct 
fall on that line of culpability somewhere between 
simple negligence and clearly intentional conduct and 
involve elements of both. A finding of gross 
negligence does not preclude a finding of intent, 
and a finding of willful misconduct does not 
preclude elements of negligence [emphasis added]. 
In reference to the above language in the Strange case, the Utah 
Court of Appeals in Doe, supra, stated that, "the trial court 
appears to have misunderstood this continuum in holding that 
defendant's actions could not, as a matter of law, constitute 
negligence since they were intentional." 
15 
Pursuant to the language and reasoning of the Utah courts, 
the Appellant Matthew S. Kellogg was entitled to plead both an 
intentional and a negligence tortf arising from the Appellees' 
conduct. Thus, the Third Judicial District Court erred, as a 
matter of law, in assuming that the two causes of action were 
mutually exclusive, and summarily applying the shorter of the two 
applicable statutes of limitations in precluding the entirety of 
the Appellant's claims against the Appellees. 
Although the actions of the Appellees were clearly 
intentional, the Appellees may not have intended the actual 
injuries which were sustained by the Appellant, and to the extent 
that they were sustained by the Appellant. See Matheson v. 
Pearson, 618 P.2d 321 (Utah 1980) [The Utah Supreme Court reversed 
a summary judgment and remanded to the trial court, holding that 
the defendant's intentional acts could have constituted reckless 
misconduct or reckless disregard for the safety of the plaintiff, 
and the Court further noted that reckless misconduct is a form of 
negligence and is distinguishable from an intentional tort]. 
Thus, the Plaintiff's and Appellant's claims for negligence, 
in addition to his claims for an intentional tort, were 
appropriate and permitted in this case. The trial court could 
have merely dismissed the Appellant's intentional cause of action 
of assault and battery on the basis that the limitations period 
16 
had expired therefor. Howeverf the trial court should have 
preserved the Plaintiff's and Appellant's negligence cause of 
actionf the limitations period for which had not yet expired at 
the time the Plaintiff and Appellant filed his Verified Complaint 
against the Defendants and Appellees. 
III. THERE ARE GENUINE ISSUES OF MATERIAL FACT REMAINING IN 
THIS CASE, AND THE DEFENDANTS WERE NOT ENTITLED TO 
JUDGMENT AS A MATTER OF LAW, PURSUANT TO RULE 56, UTAH 
RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure permits the 
disposition of a case by way of summary judgment if the following 
three elements are established by a moving party: (1) It must be 
shown that no genuine issue of material fact exists; (2) The 
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law; (3) This 
showing must preclude, as a matter of law, all reasonable 
possibilities that the losing party could win, if given a trial. 
See Thorn Cook v. Cook, 604 P.2d 934 (Utah 1979); Reeves v. Geiqy 
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 764 P.2d 636 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
Furthermore, the remedy of summary judgment should be invoked very 
reluctantly, inasmuch as it denies the non-winning party the 
chance to prove its case to the finder of fact. "Because a 
summary judgment prevents litigants from fully presenting their 
case to the court, courts are and should be reluctant to invoke 
17 
this remedy." Brandt v. Sprinqville Banking Co., 353 P.2d 460 
(Utah 1960). 
It has been held that it only takes one sworn statement to 
dispute averments on the other side of the controversy and create 
issues of fact precluding summary judgment. Holbrook Co. v. 
Adams, 542 P.2d 191 (Utah 1975). The Plaintiff and Appellant 
submitted a Verified Complaint, setting forth the facts which he 
claimed amounted to causes of action for assault and for 
negligence against the Defendants and Appellees. The Defendants, 
before the lower court, argued that in accordance with the holding 
in the case of Hall v. Fitzgerald, 671 P.2d 224 (Utah 1983), 
allegations within pleadings are not a sufficient basis for 
opposing summary judgments. 
However, the obvious exception to this rule is when there is 
a verified pleading, which "can be considered the equivalent of an 
affidavit for purpose of defeating a motion for summmary 
judgment." Pentecost v. Harward, 699 P.2d 696 (Utah 1985). 
Therefore, there is a sufficiently verified dispute as to the 
material facts in this case with respect to the Plaintiff's and 
Appellants negligence cause of action, and this would disallow the 
granting of a motion for summary judgment. Bill Brown Realty, 
Inc. v. Abbott, 562 P.2d 238 (Utah 1977). 
Furthermore, there are genuine issues of material fact 
18 
remaining with respect to the Appellant's and Plaintiff's claims 
of equitable estoppel. There was no evidence permitted, nor 
findings made, before the lower court with respect to the 
Plaintiff's claims that the Defendants were equitably estopped 
from asserting the defense of statute of limitations after failing 
to do so for more than two (2) years after they filed their 
Answers to the Plaintiff's Verified Complaint. 
The Utah Supreme Court, in CECO v. Concrete Specialists, 
Inc., 772 P.2d 967, 969-70 (Utah 1989) set forth the elements of 
equitable estoppel as follows: 
(i) a statement, admission, act or failure to act by 
one party inconsistent with a claim later asserted; 
(ii) reasonable action or inaction by the other party 
taken or not taken on the basis of the first party's 
statement, admission, act or failure to act; and 
(iii) injury to the second party that would result 
from allowing the first party to contradict or 
repudiate such statement, admission, act, or failure 
to act [emphasis added]. 
In the present case, the Defendants made the decision to refrain 
from hiring legal counsel to represent them, and the Plaintiff had 
absolutely no control over this decision. The Defendants 
attempted to defend against the Plaintiff's claims for more than 
two (2) years, failing to assert the affirmative defense of 
statute of limitations. 
The Plaintiff, in reasonable reliance upon this failure to 
act, took the appropriate action and proceeded with discovery, 
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accruing attorney fees and costs in this case. The Defendants 
should not now be able to amend their Answers, after two years of 
failing to do so, merely because they were acting by their own 
voluntary election without legal counsel, and in fact should be 
equitably estopped from so doing. In any event, the lower court 
should have permitted a trier of fact to determine these issues. 
It is undisputed that the lower court granted the Defendants' 
Motions for Summary Judgment based upon the application of the 
one-year statute of limitations corresponding to the Plaintiff's 
and Appellant's cause of action of assault. However, there are 
genuine issues of material fact remaining in this case with 
respect to the Plaintiff's and Appellant's cause of action for 
negligence, the supporting facts for which have been set forth 
within the Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, and with respect to the 
Appellant's claims of equitable estoppel. Therefore, the 
Defendants and Appellees were not entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law, and the granting of their Rule 56 Motions for Summary 
Judgment was inappropriate and amounted to a clear abuse of 
discretion by the Third Judicial District Court. 
CONCLUSION 
The Third Judicial District Court clearly abused its 
discretion in granting the Appellees' Motions to Amend their 
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Answers, as argued above. Furthermore, the Third Judicial 
District Court clearly abused its discretion, as a matter of law, 
in granting the Appellees' Motions for Summary Judgment, 
apparently laboring under the misapprehension and erroneous 
assumption that the Appellant's two causes of action were mutually 
exclusive. Finally, there are genuine issues of material fact 
involved in this case with respect to the Plaintiff's and 
Appellant's Cause of Action for Negligence, and with respect to 
the Plaintiff's and Appellant's claims of equitable estoppel, 
which issues should be remanded for such a determination to the 
Third Judicial District Court trier of fact. 
For the foregoing reasons, the Plaintiff and Appellant 
respectfully requests that the Utah Court of Appeals examine this 
case and reverse the lower court's Summary Judgments in favor of 
the Defendants and Appellees, and properly remand this case to the 
trier of fact. 
DATED this //• day of October, 1995. 
W 
^>RAY tfOLL 
Attorney f o W f c l a i n t i f f and Appe l lan t 
Ma'Wihew S. Ke l logg 
L 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing, with postage prepaid thereon, on 
this y~ day of October, 1995, to the following: 
CARMAN E. KIPP 
KIPP & CHRISTIAN 
City Center I, Suite 330 
175 East 400 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
Attorney for Appellee Robert Anthony Apgood 
ANDREW M. MORSE 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Attorney for Appellee Stan J. Christensen 
u 
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B. RAY ZOLL (3607) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
5300 South 360 West 
Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone (801) 262-1500 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MATTHEW S. KELLOGG, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STAN J. CHRISTENSEN, ROBERT 
ANTHONY APGOOD, TROY A. COX and 
ERIC TODD STRAIN, 
Defendants. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 
Judge 
Plaintiff for a cause of action against Defendants alleges as 
follows: 
COUNT I 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
2. Defendants are residents of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
M.U &km "A 
3. The incident which is the subject matter of this Complaint 
took place in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. On or about the 5th day of August, 1991 at approximately 
8:00 p.m. at the Glenmoor Golf Course located at 9800 South 4800 
West, West Jordan, Utah, Defendants, without_just cause and with a 
malicious intent to injure Plaintiff, committed an assault and 
battery upon the Plaintiff by striking Plaintiff. 
5. As a result of the Defendants' unjustified attack upon the 
Plaintiff, Plaintiff's lips were sutured and an x-ray taken 
discovered that there was a hairline fracture to Plaintiff's cheek. 
6. Defendants' malicious attack upon Plaintiff caused 
Plaintiff to incur medical expenses of $585.92 plus additional 
medical damages as will be shown at trial. 
7. In addition to the special damages suffered by Plaintiff, 
Plaintiff has suffered great pain and mental anguish as a result of 
Defendants' malicious conduct. 
8. Because Defendants' acts of attacking Plaintiff was 
knowingly done by Defendants without regard for the safety of 
2 
Plaintiff, Plaintiff is entitled to an award for punitive damages 
in the amount of $50/000.00. 
9. Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the subject damages 
as allowed by law. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants as 
follows: 
A. Judgment in the amount of $585.92 in special damages plus 
any additional amounts that are shown at trial; 
B. Judgment in the amount of $50,000.00 in punitive damages; 
C. Costs of Court; 
D. Interest as allowed by law; and 
E. Any other relief as the Court may deem just in the 
premises• 
COUNT II 
1. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations set forth in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Plaintiff's Count I as though fully set forth 
in this paragraph 1 of Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
2. On the 5th day of August, 1991 at approximately 8:00 p.m., 
Plaintiff and Defendants were involved in an argument at Glenmoor 
Golf Course located at 9800 South 4800 West, West Jordan, Utah 
concerning each party way of playing golf. 
3. During said argument, Defendants negligently hit Plaintiff 
causing a laceration to Plaintiff's lip and a hairline fracture to 
his cheek. 
4. As a result of Defendant's negligent acts, Plaintiff has 
incurred medical bills of $585.92 plus additional expenses as will 
be shown at trial. 
5. In addition, Plaintiff has suffered general damages in the 
amount of $25,000.00. 
6. Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the subject damages 
as allowed by law. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants as 
4 
follows: 
A. Judgment in the amount of $585.92 in general damages, plus 
additional expenses as will be shown at trial; 
B. Judgment in the amount of $25,000.00 in general damages; 
C. Costs of Court; 
D. Interest as allowed by law; and 
E. Any other relief the Court may deem just in the premises. 
ZOLL & BRANCH 
DATED this /> day of /QA.^ 1992. 
-^ YY 
BlJ RAY' ZOLL U 
Attorney /for Plaintiff 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Matthew S. Kellogg, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes 
and says that he is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter, 
that he has read the foregoing Complaint, knows the contents 
thereof, and that the same is true of his own knowledge, except as 
to matters therein stated to be on information and belief and as to 
those matters, he believes them to be true. 
1992. 
MATTHEW S. KELLOGG r 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this \ C< day of Apgirl, 
1 ^/> Qs~\ 
NOTARY PUBLIC 
My Commission E x p i r e s : Residing a t : \[ Q A 
*^~-^*~~~-*-^~~^~^'^*^+~«~*+-
» Jfc-NEALCUNDEMAN 
Notary Public 
STATE CF UTAH 
implalnt 
Comm. Exp. June 16,1993 
080 W 5300 S #380, SUC» IT 84123 
U.O U-h 
CARMAN E. KIPP, #1829 
SANDRA L. STEINVOORT, #5352 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
175 East 400 South, #330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2314 
(801) 521-3773 
Attorneys for Appellee Stan J. Christensen 
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
MATTHEW S. KELLOGG, 
Appellant, 
vs. 
STAN J. CHRISTENSEN and 
ROBERT ANTHONY APGOOD, 
Appellees. 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISPOSITION 
Docket No. 950198 
Appellee Stan J. Christensen hereby submits the following 
Memorandum in support of his Motion for Summary Disposition. 
FACTS 
1. On August 5, 1991, a fight occurred between the Appellees 
and Appellant at the Glenmoor Golf Course in West Jordan, Utah. 
(Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, Paragraph 4) 
2. Appellant claims to have suffered injuries as a result of 
the fight. (Plaintiff's Verified Complaint, Paragraph 5) 
u A <i E)H<bi± 6 
3. On September 21, 1992, Appellant filed his Verified 
Complaint in Third District Court alleging two causes of action, 
assault and battery and negligence. (See Attachment A) 
4. On January 31, 1995, Appellee Christiansen filed his 
Motion for Summary Judgment arguing that the statute of limitations 
for assault and battery had expired prior to the filing of the 
Complaint. Appellee Christensen further argued the Appellant could 
not conceptually convert the alleged intentional tort to a claim of 
negligence to avoid imposition of the assault statute of 
limitations. 
5. On April 25, 1995, Summary Judgment was entered on behalf 
of Appellees dismissing Appellant's Complaint with prejudice and on 
the merits. (See Attachment B) 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
In granting the Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment, the 
trial court ruled as a matter of law that the statute of 
limitations as to assault and battery had expired prior to the 
filing of the Complaint and there was no negligence cause of 
action. Legal conclusions are afforded no deference. Walker v. 
Briaham City. 856 P.2d 347 (Utah 1993). 
In reviewing whether Summary Judgment is appropriate, the 
Appellate Court reviews the facts and all reasonable inferences 
drawn therefrom in the light most favorable to the non-moving 
party. K & T, Inc. v. Koroulisr 254 Utah Advance Report 3 (1994). 
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BACKGROUND 
In order to demonstrate that the Appellant's grounds for 
review are so insubstantial as not to warrant further proceedings 
and consideration by this Court, Appellee Christiansen addresses 
each issue raised by Appellant in his Docketing Statement. 
ARGUMENT 
A. Did the trial court abuse its discretion in allowing the 
Appellees to amend their Answers and plead the 
affirmative defense of statute of limitations to the 
Plaintiff's First Cause of Action. 
Rule 15 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure states that a 
party will be freely given leave to amend his pleading when justice 
so requires. The Verified Complaint was filed on September 21, 
1992. Appellee Christiansen responded pro se. He was unaware of 
his duty to assert an affirmative defense and proceeded with the 
litigation. Once Appellee Christiansen retained counsel, counsel 
immediately requested permission from the trial court for leave to 
file an Amended Answer. 
The trial court is under a directive to freely grant a 
requesting party leave to file an amended pleading. So long as 
leave is granted and the affirmative defense is then raised, the 
defense is not waived. Staker v. Huntington Cleveland Irrigation 
Co.
 P 664 P. 2d 1188, 1190 (Utah 1983). The trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in allowing the Appellee an opportunity to 
amend his Answer because Rule 15 favors a liberal grant of leave to 
amend pleadings. If filing an Amended Answer allowed the Appellee 
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to raise an affirmative defense which summarily resolved the case, 
equity and justice required the leave to be granted, and trial 
court's entry of Summary Judgment as a matter of law was 
appropriate. 
B. Did the trial court err in granting Appellee's Motion for 
Summary Judgment as to the entirety of the Plaintiff's 
Complaint? 
The Verified Complaint alleged two causes of action: (1) 
assault and battery and (2) negligence. Appellant argued that he 
was negligently hit by the Appellees in this fight. The trial 
court considered the Appellee Christiansen's argument on both 
causes of action when it entered judgment in favor of Appellees. 
The Appellant missed filing his Verified Complaint within the 
statute of limitations period for assault and battery and could not 
then attempt to convert an intentional tort into a negligence claim 
in order to fall within the four year statute of limitations period 
applicable to a negligence cause of action. 
The Court considered the Memorandum filed in support of 
Appellee's Motion for Summary Judgment in which Appellant confirmed 
that the altercation between the parties was anuassault and that he 
was intentionally struck. (See Attachment C) In Matheson v. 
Pearsonr 619 P.2d 321, 322, this Court stated that if an individual 
engages in an intentional act but without the requisite intent of 
causing harm, the individual is not guilty of an,intentional tort 
but of negligence. Here the Appellant agreed that he was 
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intentionally assaulted. The trial court did not err in dismissing 
the negligence cause of action. 
C. Are there genuine issues of material fact remaining in 
the case, including but not limited to, equitable issues? 
The Appellant has failed to comply with Rule 9(c)(5) of the 
Rules of Appellate Procedure in that he has not expressed this 
issue in the terms and circumstances of the case. In reading the 
issue, Appellee Christensen is unable to adequately respond because 
the broad statements are applicable to any case involving the entry 
of Summary Judgment. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, the grounds for review cited by 
Appellant are so insubstantial as not to merit further proceedings 
and consideration by this Court. Therefore, this Court should 
grant Appellee's Motion for Summary Disposition and affirm the 
Order of the trial court which forms the basis of this Appeal. 
ATTACHMENTS 
A. Complaint 
B. Summary Judgment 
C. Memorandum in Support of Defendant Apgood's Motion for 
Summary Judgment 
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DATED this 31st day of May, 1995. 
KIPP AND CHRISTIAN, P.C. 
Carman E. Kipp 
Sandra L. Steinvoort 
Attorneys for Appellee 
Stan J. Christensen 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISPOSITION was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this 31st day of May, 1995 to the following: 
B. Ray Zoll 
Zoll & Branch 
5300 South 360 West 
Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Andrew M. Morse 
Snow, Christensen & Martineau 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
^ K d A l ^ . J\f\A^(MYf 
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B. RAY ZOLL (3607) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
5300 South 360 West 
Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone (801) 262-1500 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OP THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MATTHEW S. KELLOGG, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STAN J. CHRISTENSEN, ROBERT 
ANTHONY APGOOD, TROY A. COX and 
ERIC TODD STRAIN, 
Defendants. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 
Judge 
Plaintiff for a cause of action against Defendants alleges as 
follows: 
COUNT I 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
2. Defendants are residents of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
3. The incident which is the subject matter of this Complaint 
took place in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. On or about the 5th day of August, 1991 at approximately 
8:00 p.m. at the Glenmoor Golf Course located at 9800 South 4800 
West, West Jordan, Utah, Defendants, without just cause and with a 
malicious intent to injure Plaintiff, committed an assault and 
battery upon the Plaintiff by striking Plaintiff. 
5. As a result of the Defendants' unjustified attack upon the 
Plaintiff, Plaintiffs lips were sutured and an x-ray taken 
discovered that there was a hairline fracture to Plaintiff's cheek. 
6. Defendants' malicious attack upon Plaintiff caused 
Plaintiff to incur medical expenses of $585.92 plus additional 
medical damages as will be shown at trial. 
7. In addition to the special damages suffered by Plaintiff, 
Plaintiff has suffered great pain and mental anguish as a result of 
Defendants' malicious conduct. 
8. Because Defendants' acts of attacking Plaintiff was 
knowingly done by Defendants without regard for the safety of 
2 
Plaintiff, Plaintiff is entitled to an award for punitive damages 
in the amount of $50,000.00. 
9. Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the subject damages 
as allowed by law. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants as 
follows: 
A. Judgment in the amount of $585.92 in special damages plus 
any additional amounts that are £*hown at trial; 
B. Judgment in „the amount-of $50,000.00 .in punitive^damages; 
C. Costs of Court; 
D. Interest as allowed by law; and 
E. Any other relief as the Court may deem just in the 
premises. 
COUNT II 
1. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations set forth in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Plaintiff's Count I as though fully set forth 
in this paragraph 1 of Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
2. On the 5th day of August, 1991 at approximately 8:00 p.m., 
Plaintiff and Defendants were involved in an argument at Glenmoor 
Golf Course located at 9800 South 4800 West, West Jordan, Utah 
concerning each party way of playing golf. 
3. During said argument, Defendants negligently hit Plaintiff 
causing a laceration to Plaintiff's lip and a hairline fracture to 
his cheek. 
4. As a result of Defendant's negligent acts, Plaintiff has 
incurred medical bills of $585.92 plus additional expenses as will 
be shown at trial. 
5. In addition, Plaintiff has suffered general damages in the 
amount of $25,000.00. 
6. Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the subject damages 
as allowed by law. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants as 
4 
follows: 
A. Judgment in the amount of $585.92 in general damages, plus 
additional expenses as will be shown at trial; 
B. Judgment in the amount of $25,000.00 in general damages; 
C. Costs of Court; 
D. Interest as allowed by law; and 
E. Any other relief the Court may deem just in the premises. 
fi£ ' "A ' 
DATED this I y day of //U.>) , 1992. 
/ ? , 
\&L 
B'J RAY' ZOLL (J 
A t t o r n e y /for P l a i n t i f f 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Matthew S. Kellogg, being first duly sworn under oath, deposes 
and says that he is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter, 
that he has read the foregoing Complaint, knows the contents 
thereof, and that the same is true of his own knowledge, except as 
to matters therein stated to be on information and belief and as to 
those matters, he believes them to be true. 
1992. 
MATTHEW S. KELLOGG 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this \ Q day of Apsirl, 
; j V N - V ^ ^ I 
My Commission E x p i r e s : Resuming a t : \[ (V A I I » ^ 
JbNEALCUNDEMAN 
Notary PubBc 
STATE CF UTAH 
complaint 
Comm. Exp. Jur» 18,1993 
000 WWOO S #300, SUC» UT 84123 I 
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ANDREW M. MORSE (A4498) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Apgood 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MATTHEW S. KELLOGG, 
MEMORANDUM SUPPORTING 
Plaintiff, MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
vs. 
STAN J. CHRISTENSEN and 
ROBERT ANTHONY APGOOD, Case No. 920905255 
Defendants. Judge Tyrone E. Medley 
Defendant Apgood submits this Memorandum supporting his Motion for Summary 
Judgment. 
INTRODUCTION 
This is an assault and battery case, arising from a fight between the plaintiff and the 
defendants. Plaintiff pleads two counts: assault and battery, and negligence. The one-year 
statute of limitations bars the assault and battery claim; the negligence claim fails because it is 
undisputed mat no negligence was involved. 
FACTS 
1. This defendants joins in and adopts the Statement of Undisputed Facts contained 
in the Memorandum supporting Defendant Christensen's Motion for Summary Judgment, dated 
1-31-95. 
2. The plaintiff testified: "And the next thing I know, I get grabbed from my left 
side, which is where Christensen was, spun around and hit in the side of the face by Apgood 
with a right hook and dropped me to my knees." (Plaintiffs deposition p. 18, attached as 
Exhibit A). 
3. Plaintiff admitted that the blow struck by Mr. Apgood was not accidental: 
Q. Would you say that Mr. Atwood meant to hit you? 
A. Atwood or Apgood? 
Q. I'm sorry, Apgood? 
A. I believe his name is Apgood. Yeah, I would definitely say he meant to 
hit me. As a matter of fact, after he hit me, he was standing over top of 
me doing his Hulk Hogan imitation screaming at me like he was King 
Kong. I remember looking up and seeing that. (Plaintiffs depo, p. 51, 
attached as Exhibit B). 
ARGUMENT 
Plaintiffs assault and battery claim is barred by the one-year statute of limitations. 
U.C.A. § 78-12-29 (1953 as amended). This defendant joins in and adopts Defendant 
Christensen's Memorandum supporting his Motion for Summary Judgment. 
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Plaintiffs negligence claim also fails. He admits that defendant Christensen intended to 
strike him. [Statement of Facts, 11 2 & 3]. This testimony refutes his own verified allegation 
that "[defendants negligently hit plaintiff . . . ." (Verified Complaint 1 3, attached as 
Exhibit C]. Plaintiffs attempt to avoid the one-year assault and battery statute by alleging 
negligence fails, because the undisputed facts are that defendants were not negligent. 
CONCLUSION 
Summary judgment should issue for the reasons stated above. 
DATED this ^ day of February, 1995. 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
By 
Andrew M. Morse 
Attorneys for Defendant 
Robert Anthony Apgood 
26\AMMM5607.038\pWg.mem 
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1 because I thought he was going to shove me again. 
2 Q You're showing me your hands up kind of level 
3 with the ground and out in front of you? 
4 A Right, both of them. Both of my hands were 
5 where his shoulders were so that he didn't swing at me 
6 again. He shoves me, and this all happened really fast. 
7 He shoves me hard. I took a step back. I put my hands 
8 out like this, about his shoulder-length high, and I 
9 believe my hands were on his shoulders like this. 
10 And the next thing I know, I get grabbed from 
11 my left side, which is where Christensen was, spun around 
12 and hit in the side of the face by Apgood with a right 
13 hook and dropped me to my knees. And I put my hand up 
14 like this, and I had blood going everywhere. 
15 Q You're showing me your hand to your face? 
16 A Right. 
17 Q Your right hand? 
18 A I had blood going all over, and the next thing 
19 I know, the people from the golf course are there 
2 0 breaking it up. My friend Darren, he's probably not 
21 going to admit this, but he was scared to death. First 
22 thing he did is run to the cart, which was 10 yards back, 
23 and grab a golf club and start swinging a golf club; not 
24 at them, from a distance. Yelling, "Come on.w 
25 Because I could tell — I mean, there's four 
MERIT REPORTERS 18 
1 A Asks me about what? 
2 Q Your scar. 
3 A No. 
4 Q Would you say that Mr. Atwood meant to hit 
5 you? 
6 A Atwood or Apgood? 
7 Q I'm sorry, Apgood. 
8 A I believe his name is Apgood. Yeah, I would 
9 definitely say he meant to hit me. As a matter of fact, 
10 after he hit me, he was standing over top of me doing his 
11 Hulk Hogan imitation screaming at me like he was King 
12 Kong. I remember looking up and seeing that. 
13 Q What did he say? 
14 A He was just — he was pumped up, adrenaline. 
15 I don't know what he said. He was pumped up standing 
16 over top of me like he just took me out, and he had. 
17 Q But you don't remember what he said? 
18 A I can't remember exactly what he said, no. 
19 Q Do you remember generally what he said, or 
2 0 have you told me everything you remember about it? 
21 A Generally, I believe he was just kind of 
22 yelling at me, whatever. I do not know what he said 
23 exactly. 
24 Q Did he threaten to hit you again? 
25 A I don't think he needed to. I wasn't going 
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B. RAY ZOLL (3607) 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
5300 South 360 West 
Suite 360 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84123 
Telephone (801) 262-1500 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
MATTHEW S. KELLOGG, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STAN J. CHRISTENSEN, ROBERT 
ANTHONY APGOOD, TROY A. COX and 
ERIC TODD STRAIN, 
Defendants. 
VERIFIED COMPLAINT 
Civil No. 
Judge 
P l a i n t i f f for a cause of act ion aga ins t Defendants a l l e g e s as 
f o l l o w s : 
COUNT I 
1. Plaintiff is a resident of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
2. Defendants are residents of Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah. 
3. The incident which is the subject matter of this Complaint 
took place in Salt Lake County, State of Utah. 
4. On or about the 5th day of August, 1991 at approximately 
8:00 p.m. at the Glenmoor Golf Course located at 9800 South 4800 
West, West Jordan, Utah, Defendants, without just cause and with a 
malicious intent to injure Plaintiff, committed an assault and 
battery upon the Plaintiff by striking Plaintiff. 
5. As a result of the Defendants' unjustified attack upon the 
Plaintiff, Plaintiff's lips were sutured and an x-ray taken 
discovered that there was a hairline fracture to Plaintiff's cheek. 
6. Defendants' malicious attack upon Plaintiff caused 
Plaintiff to incur medical expenses of $585.92 plus additional 
medical damages as will be shown at trial. 
7. In addition to the special damages suffered by Plaintiff, 
Plaintiff has suffered great pain and mental anguish as a result of 
Defendants' malicious conduct. 
8. Because Defendants' acts of attacking Plaintiff was 
knowingly done by Defendants without regard for the safety of 
2 
Plaintiff, Plaintiff is entitled to an award for punitive damages 
in the amount of $50,000.00. 
9. Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the subject damages 
as allowed by law. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff prays judgment against Defendants as 
follows: 
A. Judgment in the amount of $585.92 in special damages plus 
any additional amounts that are shown at trial; 
B. Judgment in the amount of $50,000.00 in punitive damages; 
C. Costs of Court; 
D. Interest as allowed by law; and 
E. Any other relief as the Court may deem just in the 
premises. 
COUNT II 
1. Plaintiff incorporates the allegations set forth in 
paragraphs 1 and 2 of Plaintiff's Count I as though fully set forth 
in this paragraph 1 of Count II of Plaintiff's Complaint. 
2. On the 5th day of August, 1991 at approximately 8:00 p.m., 
Plaintiff and Defendants were involved in an argument at Glenmoor 
Golf Course located at 9800 South 4800 West, West Jordan, Utah 
concerning each party way of playing golf. 
3. During said argument, Defendants negligently hit Plaintiff 
causing a laceration to Plaintiff's.lip and a hairline fracture to 
his cheek. 
4. As a result of Defendant's negligent acts, Plaintiff has 
incurred medical bills of $585,92 plus additional expenses as will 
be shown at trial. 
5. In addition, Plaintiff has suffered general damages in the 
amount of $25,000.00. 
6. Plaintiff is entitled to interest on the subject damages 
as allowed by law. 
WHEREFORE, Plaintiff ~prays judgment against Defendants as 
4 
follows: 
A. Judgment in the amount of $585,92 in general damages, plus 
additional expenses as will be shown at trial; 
B. Judgment in the amount of $25,000.00 in general damages; 
C. Costs of Court; 
D. Interest as allowed by law; and 
E. Any other relief the Court may deem just in the premises. 
DATED this \? day of /ft*j*l 1992. 
B^RAY' ZOU, (J ' 
Attorney /for Plaintiff 
VERIFICATION 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
•: SS 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Matthew S. Kellogg, being f i r s t duly sworn under oath, deposes 
and says that he is the Plaintiff in the above-entitled matter, 
that he has read the foregoing Complaint, knows the contents 
thereof, and that the same is true of his own knowledge, except as 
to matters therein stated to be on information and belief and as to 
those matters, he believes them to be true, 
MATTHEW S. KELLOGG r 
Subscribed and sworn to before me this \ (.'• " day of -Apg^l, 
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ANDREW M. MORSE (A4498) 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Apgood 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145-5000 
Telephone: (801)521-9000 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MATTHEW S. KELLOGG, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
STAN J. CHRISTENSEN and 
ROBERT ANTHONY APGOOD, 
Defendants. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Case No. 920905255 
Judge William A. Thome 
The defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment came on for regularly scheduled hearing 
on March 30, 1995. The Court heard argument from all parties. Based upon the Memorandum 
filed with the Coun, and die parties' oral argument, and for cause appearing, the Coun grants 
defendants' Motions for Summary Judgment and 
ORDERS mat the plaintiffs Complaint be dismissed with prejudice and on the merits. 
DATED this, day of April, 1995. 
BY THE COURT 
Approved as to form 
ZOLL & BRANCH 
By. 
UB. Ray Zoll 
Attorneys for1 
KIPP/AJ^D CHRISTIAl<tlp^€. 
Carman E.1 Kipp 
Attorneys for Defen3a&, 
Christensen 
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